

U. S. Appears to Expect A Nationalist Red China

Mao Tze-tung Is Counted Upon to Oppose Soviet Expansionism Toward East

By C. L. SULZBERGER

Quite plainly the policymakers of the United States are counting upon the historic forces of Chinese nationalism to assert themselves as strongly under a Mao Tze-tung Government vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. as they did under a Chiang Kai-shek Government vis-a-vis the United States.

The areas of disintegrating China bitten off by direct Soviet control in Mongolia and Manchuria and being bitten off in Sinkiang Province (Chinese Turkestan) are likely to prove a source of powerful trouble some day.

Moscow's policy, which is clearly derived from the Tsarist Russian traditional eastward drive (similar to the westward transcontinental movement in the United States) is evidently to absorb within the Soviet Union the Chinese salient that tends to isolate the U.S.S.R.'s Pacific provinces.

The Kremlin, it would seem, is not permitting questions of ideological sympathy to interfere with the project of linking Chita, in the Lake Baikal area of Siberia, to Vladivostok in the Soviet Maritime Provinces by way of Manchuria. It is known not only that Mr. Mao was considerably irked by the Manchurian treaty between Moscow and T. V. Soong but that he feels doubly betrayed by the current negotiations on Sinkiang between the Soviet consul at Urumchi and Gen. Chang Chih-chung of the shadowy Nationalist Government.

The vein of friction between Chinese and Soviet nationalism runs through various segments of the shifting Chinese picture. Although Soviet influence predominates in northern Manchuria, where Li Li-san is political boss and Gen. Lin Piao supervises the army, reports of disagreement persist.

Dispute in Manchuria

Last year, for example, there was a dispute between Mr. Li's supporters (generally classified as the Stalinists) and the so-called "native" Communists.

The Li Li-san faction at that time wished to conquer Mukden and only Manchuria while the opponents demanded a southward move into China proper, where Mr. Mao's power was being consolidated around Tientsin and Peiping.

Chinese nationalism appeared to run counter to Soviet conceptions in Inner Mongolia, where a Yen-an Mongol named Yun Tse had established an administrative center. Yun Tse seemed to land up afoul of the Stalinist Mongols and he has now disappeared from the scene.

There is evidence that both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Government are somewhat baffled by what has been occur-

ring during the past few months in China. Mr. Mao's followers seem to feel furious and betrayed by the voracious appetite of their Communist guardian in Moscow. The Russians were apparently just as bewildered by the speed with which the Central Government changed as were the Germans taken aback by the rapidity of France's collapse in 1940.

The uncertainty of the situation has been further complicated by the tactic of the disintegrating Nationalist regime in starting negotiations simultaneously with both the U.S.S.R. (over Sinkiang) and Mr. Mao (on peace terms).

Regarding this confusion from a distance is the inscrutable Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo, according to responsible quarters, is quietly sitting back and betting upon the possibilities of World War III.

Can Resume Operations

It is worth pointing out that he retired without resigning. He is thus in a technical position to begin political operations again at some future date. Because of provincial opposition, the only bases from which he could resume such efforts are Fukien or Formosa.

Formosa, actually, would be far less desirable from his point of view because of the existence on that island not only of a strong faction agitating to return to Japanese rule but of a vigorous separatist and freedom movement.

The potentiality of President Chiang's resumption of activity is the reason for Mr. Mao's insistence that he be surrendered. For the same reason—because such a recrudescence must have its geographical base—Mr. Mao wishes to drive on south and occupy all such bases.

But there are two ways of applying this strategy and Mr. Mao disagrees with his younger army elements on methods. He would like to negotiate a swift peace and to achieve the political conquest of the south. The army wishes to press on with the war and overrun holdout areas.

This division among the Chinese Communists, plus the fact that there still are resistance elements of importance in South China, plays into Soviet hands. Since V-J day, driven entirely by their own power and armed largely with captured Japanese and American weapons, Mr. Mao's armies have conquered a larger area than that taken over by the U.S.S.R. since V-E day.

This basic fact is not lost sight of by the wise men of the Kremlin, who are ready to employ any handy check-rein to govern the headstrong course of what could some day develop into a massive Asiatic Titoism.